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  Studies that focus on the effect that carbon reducing policies would have on agriculture have 
revealed a strong connection between carbon emissions and irrigation.  In light of the recent debate about 
how to regulate the use of the Ogallala Aquifer by landowners on the Texas High Plains, this connection 
poses an interesting question.  Could water conservation be realized through carbon policy?  This study 
seeks to answer this question by using optimization methods to examine the effect of both a tax on carbon 
emissions and a subsidy for emissions reduction on the Texas High Plains.  The results show that a tax or 
subsidy that reduces carbon emissions to 15% of a baseline estimate also reduces the amount of water 
used for irrigation by about 20%; however, the amount that must be paid in either taxes or subsidies may 












  The concern about the effect of man-made carbon emissions has led to concerns about how we 
interact with the environment.  The predicted effects of large scale changes in the earth’s climate are 
many and include changes in water availability, changes in ecosystem structures, changes in agricultural 
productivity, and changes in sea level, as well as various impacts on the human population (United 
Nations, 2007).  There appears to be little debate on the contribution of carbon emissions to climate 
change, but there is uncertainty about the severity of the changes listed above (McKibben and Wilcoxen, 
2002); as such, there is an ongoing debate about whether or not anything should be done to change how 
we live our lives in order to mitigate the problem.  This debate, however, has not prevented governments 
from attempting to curb the emission of carbon by humans. 
  In the United States, the most recent of these efforts was the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 (the “Waxman-Markey” bill) in the House of Representatives.  This bill is important not only 
for its proposed changes in how the nation deals with carbon emissions, such as setting up a cap and trade 
scheme for carbon regulation, but also for the fact that it passed in House before stalling in the Senate.  
No other bill regulating carbon emissions in America had gone so far through the legislative process.  
Along with this legislative effort, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims that it already has 
the right to regulate carbon emission via the Clean Air Act and has created new regulations regarding 
carbon emissions; although the EPA’s authority to do so is being challenged in federal court.  While 
neither of these attempts to regulate carbon would affect agricultural production, the willingness of 
policymakers to confront the issue of climate change in the United States has drawn the interest of 
researchers and industries alike. 
  Researchers at the University of Arkansas have sought to determine how a cap and trade policy 
would affect agricultural production in different parts of the nation.  The first step was to develop a 
method by which emissions could be calculated at the farm level using Life Cycle Analysis (Popp, et. al, 2010).  Using the calculations from this approach, an optimization model was developed that maximized 
net farm income while including the additional revenue from trading carbon credits in a carbon offset 
market, like the type of market that would have been established for other industries by Waxman-Markey 
(Nalley and Popp, 2010).  Scenarios that calculated both gross and net carbon emissions were considered 
and produced different results.   The study showed that whether gross or net carbon emissions are 
considered is important to who benefits from trading carbon credits in a carbon offset market.  Areas in 
the study that were high emitters of carbon were also high sequesterers of carbon; thus, when only gross 
carbon emissions are considered in emission calculations these areas do not benefit from trading in an 
offset market, but when net emissions are considered these areas can benefit from selling carbon credits.  
The same is true of certain crops, such as corn, that were found to be both high emitters and sequesterers 
of carbon.   
  Studies of how carbon reduction policies would affect agricultural production have also found 
that there is a connection between carbon emissions and irrigation.  The carbon calculations used by 
Popp, et. al (2010), and Nalley and Popp (2010) show that center pivot irrigation is a large contributor to 
carbon emissions in agriculture due to the energy involved in pumping water from the ground.  Wright 
and Hudson (2011) estimate the impact on farmer’s net revenue on the Texas High Plains of a 95% and 
85% reduction on carbon emissions compared to a baseline scenario with no constraint on emissions.  The 
study calculated carbon in a manner similar to that of Popp et al., but allows for the amount of water as an 
input in the production process to vary as a choice variable in the model.  The result is that the choices of 
what crop to plant and how many acres to plant tended to remain constant while the number of acre-
inches applied to a crop is reduced to meet the constraint.  
  The connection between carbon reduction and water use reduction found by Wright and Hudson 
implies that in agriculture a carbon reduction policy is a restriction on water use.  In light of the recent 
debate about how to regulate the use of the Ogallala Aquifer by landowners on the Texas High Plains, this 
result poses an interesting question.  Could water conservation be realized through carbon policy?  This study seeks to answer this question by examining the effect of both a tax on carbon emissions and a 
subsidy for emissions reduction on the Texas High Plains.  Specifically, optimization methods will be 
used to determine what level of tax or subsidy is necessary to influence a reduction in carbon emissions, 
and to determine the effect these policies have on farmers’ net revenue, crop and acreage choices, and 
water usage.      
Data & Methods 
Study Area and Data Sources   
The study area chosen for this project was the Texas High Plains, an area of forty counties in the 
northwest part of the state.  The total shaded area in Figure 1 illustrates the layout of these counties.  The 
blue shaded area depicts the Northern High Plains and the red shaded area depicts the Southern High 
Plains.  For each of these counties, a representative farm was established where corn, cotton, peanuts, 
sorghum, and wheat were grown.  Only irrigated production was considered for corn and peanuts, while 
for cotton, sorghum, and wheat both dryland and irrigated production was allowed; thus, there were eight 
different crops considered in the study.   
Information for the crops and counties came from three primary sources. First, crop budgets 
published by the Texas A&M Extension Service for the years 2008 to 2010 provided information on crop 
prices, per acre costs, and per acre input quantities.
1  For the price and input cost data, the average over all 
three budgets was used.  Second, to calculate per acre yield for irrigated crops, functions were obtained 
from previous studies that had been performed on the High Plains (Wheeler et al., 2006; New, 2010).  
Finally, NASS statistics for planted acres, harvested acres, and yields for the years 2000 to 2009 for each 
crop in each county were used to provide realistic bounds for the model. 
 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that Zivkovic and Hudson have questioned the validity of using crop budgets to develop carbon 
emissions estimates, but a calibration method has yet to be developed.  We use the budgets here, but the reader 
should note that the resulting total carbon emissions estimates are likely high relative to actual farm emissions. The Model 
Using the above information, the same non-linear programming model used in Wright and 
Hudson (2011) was used to maximize net revenue for each county.  To estimate the model, the Excel 
Premium Solver program developed by Frontline Systems was used.   
The objective function of the model is specified as: 
(1)                                               . 
In the revenue function,     is the number of acres of crop j harvested in county i,     is per acre yield for 
crop j in county i, and    is the unit price for crop j.  In the cost function,     is defined as the number of 
acres of crop j planted in county i,     is the per acre specified costs, excluding irrigation costs, for crop j 
in county i according to the extension service budgets,    is the cost associated with pumping from the 
aquifer in each county, and      is the number of acre inches from the aquifer in county i applied to crop j.  
For the purpose of this study all irrigation is assumed to come from center pivot systems. 
  In this model, the decision variables are     and    , the acres planted and amount of water 
applied to each crop.  Harvested acreage is a function of planted acres such that              where     is 
defined as the ratio of the average harvested acreage to the average planted acreage for each crop and 
county.  For irrigated crops,     is a quadratic function of the amount of water applied,    , while for 
dryland crops the yield is set at the ten year average yield according to the NASS data.  Finally, per acre 
specified costs for each crop were adjusted to 60% of the value in the budgets for two reasons.  First, the 
calculations do not include government supports and reducing the costs account for this.  Second, the 
extension service budgets tend to overestimate the amount of inputs that farmers will use during 
production; therefore, reducing the specified cost more accurately represents the actual costs faced by the 
producer. 
The constraints of the model are as follows: (2)               , 
(3)                   , 
(4)                  , and 
(5)             . 
Equations 2 and 3 are meant to constrain acreage and yield to amounts that would be reasonable for the 
Texas High Plains according to historical data.  Equation 2 states that per acre crop yield in a county is at 
least the minimum yield reported by NASS for the county.  Equation 3 states that the amount of acres of a 
crop planted in a county cannot exceed the maximum amount that is historically planted.  Equations 4 and 
5 constrain water use in each county so that for irrigated crops (4) the amount of water used cannot 
exceed twenty-three acre-inches and for the dryland crops (5) the amount of water that can be applied is 
zero. 
Calculating Carbon Emissions 
  Carbon emissions in the model were calculated using the method used by Popp, et. al (2010) in 
which each unit of input in the extension service budget is equated to a number of units of carbon emitted.  
For example, if one lb. of fertilizer is equivalent to 0.2 lbs. of carbon emitted, then applying twenty five 
pounds of fertilizer to an acre of a crop is equivalent to that acre emitting five pounds of carbon.  Adding 
up the calculated emissions for each input results in the per acre carbon emission for the crop in question.  
This study makes use of gross carbon emissions and makes no attempt to calculate net carbon emissions.  
Figures 2 and 3 show per acre carbon emissions estimated from the extension service budgets for 
dryland and irrigated crops respectively.  Emissions for dryland crops range between about sixty and one 
hundred pounds of carbon per acre.  Emissions for irrigated crops are much higher, ranging in the mid 
five hundreds for cotton, sorghum, and wheat and in the eight hundreds for corn and peanuts.  These 
emission calculations assume that producers apply to a crop the amount of each input specified in its 
budget.  To evaluate how water use might change under different carbon reducing policies, this study differs from Popp et. al by allowing the amount of water applied to each crop to vary as a decisions 
variable, thus the carbon emissions calculated in the model will vary depending upon how much  water is 
applied to each crop. 
Evaluating Carbon Policies 
  Using the above model and method of calculation carbon, two policies were considered to 
encourage carbon reduction: a per unit tax on emissions and a per unit subsidy for carbon abatement.  
First, an initial run for each county was performed with no restriction placed on carbon, the results of 
which provided baseline estimates of net revenue, acreage, water usage, and carbon emissions.  The 
model was then estimated a second time with carbon emissions restricted to 85% of the baseline.  The 
shadow price of this restriction for each county became the amount of the tax or subsidy per unit of 
carbon emitted or abated in subsequent runs of the model. 
  The shadow price of the constraint on carbon can be interpreted as how much the farmer would 
be willing to pay to emit one more pound per acre of carbon beyond the restriction.  By charging a per 
unit tax equal to the shadow price for each pound of carbon emitted above the policy goal, the farmer 
could be forced to reduce his or her carbon emissions down to the point where the tax equals his 
willingness to pay to emit.  Similarly, paying the farmer a per unit subsidy equal to the shadow price for 
each pound of carbon not emitted, the farmer could be convinced to reduce his or her emissions down to 
the point where the subsidy equals how much he or she values one more pound of carbon. 
  To evaluate the effect of a tax, the original model was modified to include a new term: 
(6)                                                               . 
In this new specification,    is defined as the total emissions for county i,    is the total emissions 
calculated in the baseline, and    is the per unit tax on emissions.  According to this specification, farmers in the county are taxed for any emissions above a goal emission of 85% of the baseline.  To avoid a 
negative tax and new constraint was added: 
(7)                . 
Similarly, a subsidy for carbon emission reduction was evaluated using the specification: 
(8)                                                            , 
where    is the subsidy per unit of carbon reduced from the baseline.  In this specification a farmer is paid 
a subsidy for each pound of carbon under the baseline they choose not to emit.  The same constraint 
specified in (7) was used to constrain the reduction in emissions to 85% of the baseline.  Both of these 
alternate models were estimated for each county and the results compared to the results from the baseline 
and 85% constrained runs of the original model. 
  After running the model using equations (6) and (8) and the individual shadow prices for each 
county, the tax and subsidy models were estimtaed a second time using the average shadow price.  Using 
the individual county shadow price assumes that whatever agency implements these policies would 
charge a different tax or pays a different subsidy for each farm.  Averaging the shadow price from each 
county provides a single tax or subsidy amount for the region.  The results using this average can be 
compared to the results using the individual shadow price to determine how effective a single tax or 
subsidy would be at reducing carbon emissions across the region.     
Results 
County Shadow Prices 
  The shadow prices estimated by the model are reported in tables 1 and 2.  Shadow prices in the 
Northern High Plains (NHP) have an average value of 0.27, or $.27 per pound of carbon, with a high of 
0.4 and a low of 0.1.  In the Southern High Plains (SHP), the average shadow price is .67, or $.67 per 
pound of carbon, with a high of 2.6 and a low of 0.2.  District 2 shadow prices are higher because there is more irrigated agriculture practiced in this area.  Farmers in these counties require more water for 
production and, therefore, place a higher value on the ability to emit carbon in the form of energy 
expenditures for irrigation.  The average shadow price across all counties in the region is 0.435, or $.44 
per pound. 
Net Revenue  
  Table 3 reports the total net revenue for the entire Texas High Plains (THP), the Northern High 
Plains, and Southern High Plains.  Comparing the baseline run of the model to the constrained run 
reduces net revenue by about 9% for the region as a whole.  The NHP sees about a 6% decrease in net 
revenue, and the SHP sees about a 10% decrease. 
  Using each county’s individual shadow price as the tax rate results in an 8.3% decrease in net 
revenues compared to the baseline.  For many counties, the model was able to reduce carbon to the goal 
level of emissions while maintaining higher net revenue than was estimated in the constrained run of the 
model.  When restricting carbon through a constraint, the model would generally maintain a county’s 
baseline acreage and reduce the amount of water applied; but, when using a tax to restrict carbon, the 
model would reduce acreage so that more water could be applied to irrigated crops.  As a result, per acre 
profit increased and the total net revenue estimated for the area is slightly greater than the amount 
estimated in the constrained model.     
Using the average tax rate reduces net revenue for the area by about 14% compared to the 
baseline, and by about 6.5% compared to a specific county tax; however, there was one county for which 
the model could not find an optimal solution using the average tax rate.  The lack of data for this county 
makes comparisons between the two tax scenarios difficult; however, it is reasonable to assume that the 
difference between the scenarios can be explained at least in part by the absence of the missing county 
from the aggregate results.  The net revenue for the missing county using its individual shadow price was 
about $115 million, which accounts for most of the total difference between the scenarios.  The shadow price for the missing county was estimated at 1.2, which is about three times the average value, so it is 
likely that using the average shadow price as a tax rate would not completely reduce carbon emissions to 
the goal level and the county would incur some tax.  Based on the results from the model, using an 
average tax rate for the region would reduce net revenue compared to a scenario where an individual tax 
rate for each county is used; however, the amount of the difference is unclear.  
When considering a subsidy as a means to reduce carbon emissions, using each county’s 
individual shadow price compensates producers so that net revenue remains close to the level found in the 
baseline.  In fact, the net revenue for the entire region slightly increases when a subsidy is offered for 
carbon reduction; however, when using the average shadow price as the subsidy level net revenue for the 
region decreases by 3.7%.  Similar to the case of an average tax, there was one county in the south for 
which an optimal solution using the average subsidy amount could not be found.  Including this county in 
a real world subsidy would increase producer net revenue in this scenario closer to the baseline.   
Acreage 
  The total acres of each crop planted in the Northern High Plains and in the Southern High Plains 
are listed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  NHP acreage shows little variation across the various scenarios.  
While there are slight changes in sorghum, wheat, and corn, the amount of acreage gained or lost is 
generally too small to be economically meaningful, and cotton acreage stays constant throughout.  SHP 
acreage saw more variability in acreage, especially in the case of irrigated wheat, peanuts, and cotton.  
The variability of cotton is especially interesting considering its real world importance to the area and the 
fact that in the northern region cotton acres remained constant.  The fact that cotton acres are reduced in 
the southern region could mean that managing carbon emissions in this area could have impacts beyond 
the High Plains in the global cotton market.   
 
 Carbon Emissions 
  Total carbon emissions for the region in each scenario are shown in Table 6.  In every tax and 
subsidy scenario, carbon emissions are close to the 85% constraint.  Interestingly, this holds true in the 
Southern High Plains despite the fact that many of the counties in the southern region had a shadow price 
greater than the average.  Further study of each individual county revealed that the model was able to find 
a solution in many of these counties that reduces emissions to 85% of the baseline even with a lower tax 
or subsidy than dictated by the shadow price.  This result indicates that using the average shadow price as 
the tax or subsidy amount would be effective as an incentive for reducing carbon emissions even in areas 
that exhibit a very high value for carbon emissions. 
Water Use  
  The total amount of water allocated to each crop in the northern and southern regions is shown in 
Tables 7 and 8.   In the northern counties the majority of water pumped from the aquifer is applied to corn 
while cotton and wheat are allocated similar amounts; however, NHP wheat acreage is twice that of 
cotton acreage so the amount of water applied per acre to cotton is higher.  In the southern counties cotton 
receives the vast majority of the water pumped from the aquifer; possibly part of the reason that cotton 
acreage reduces so much when carbon emissions are constrained.  While the water applied to all of the 
crops decreases when carbon is constrained, the percent change in the amount of water applied to wheat, 
and sorghum is much higher than the change in the amount applied to corn, cotton or peanuts.     
Table 9 shows the change in total water use for the region.  Constraining carbon by any means 
produces similar water savings.  For the region as a whole, constraining carbon to 85% of the baseline 
would result in about 22.3% less water applied to crop production.  The northern and southern regions 
would see similar reductions in water use.  These results suggest that constraining carbon emissions could 
significantly reduce water use in the region.     
 Discussion and Conclusions 
  The results of this study indicate that by either taxing carbon emissions above a certain threshold 
or by subsidizing the reduction of carbon emissions, the Texas High Plains could indeed see reductions in 
the amount of water pumped from the Ogallala Aquifer.  When aiming to reduce emissions by 15% the 
model showed that more than 20% less water was applied to crop production.  Achieving these savings 
resulted in net revenue decreasing to about 90% of the baseline in the case of a tax, and net revenue 
remaining at a level similar to the baseline in the case of a subsidy  
  While such policies may seem to achieve the stated goal, there are still some questions about their 
feasibility.  One question that still needs to be answered is whether or not the price of either of these 
policies is too high.  One might argue that charging $.44 per pound of carbon is too much.  At this price 
per pound, farmers would pay a total of $5 million in taxes to the government or the government would 
be paying about $200 million in subsidies to farmers. Whether either of these parties could afford to pay, 
or should pay, the related amount is questionable.  One way to evaluate the price of carbon estimated in 
this study would be to compare it to the market price of carbon; however, at this time there is no market 
for carbon in the United States, so determining if the value of carbon estimated in this study is too high is 
difficult.  
  A second question regarding the feasibility of these policies is what unintended consequences 
they might have with regard to production practices.  This entire study is based on the premise that 
linkages between carbon emissions and water can lead to water conservation, but what other linkages 
might exist that disrupt this relationship?  This study assumes the use of center pivot technology, but 
would imposing carbon restrictions spur a shift to alternate irrigation systems such as drip irrigation?  
Drip irrigation emits a significantly smaller amount of carbon that center pivot irrigation, and the higher 
yields realized with drip systems actually tend to encourage water use.  The implication is that enacting 
carbon restrictions in irrigation might actually increase water use in the long run.   Further research along the lines of this study is needed before any type of carbon reduction policy 
is actually considered.  The above questions are obvious candidates for future projects, and the 
consideration of net carbon emissions is another.  Previous studies show that considering net emissions 
does have an effect on the results of the model.  Currently the calculations necessary to include 
sequestration in model for the Texas High Plains are not far enough along to use; however, it would be 
appropriate to include sequestrations in later versions of this project once the methods are available.  
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Corn   Cotton   Peanuts   Sorghum   Wheat  
Table 1.  Shadow prices for NHP counties  
County  Shadow Price     County  Shadow Price 
Armstrong  0.4 
 
Hemphill  0.2 
Briscoe  0.3 
 
Hutchinson  0.4 
Carson  0.3 
 
Lipscomb  0.2 
Collingsworth  0.3 
 
Moore  0.3 
Dallam  0.4 
 
Ochiltree  0.2 
Deaf Smith  0.2 
 
Oldham  0.1 
Donley  0.3 
 
Potter  0.1 
Gray  0.2 
 
Randall  0.2 
Hall  0.4 
 
Roberts  0.2 
Hansford  0.2 
 
Sherman  0.4 
Hartley  0.3     Wheeler  0.3 
 
Table 2.  Shadow prices for SHP counties  
County  Shadow Price     County  Shadow Price 
Bailey  0.3 
 
Hockley  0.3 
Borden  0.4 
 
Lamb  0.2 
Castro  0.2 
 
Lubbock  0.4 
Cochran  2.6 
 
Lynn  1.0 
Crosby  No Results 
 
Parmer  0.3 
Dawson  0.6 
 
Scurry  1.3 
Floyd  0.2 
 
Swisher  0.2 
Gaines  0.5 
 
Terry  1.2 
Garza  1.1 
 
Yoakum  0.5 
Hale  0.2          
 
Table 3.  Summary of Net Revenue 
   THP  NHP  SHP 
Baseline    $           1,952,081,104    $              491,976,297    $           1,460,104,807  
Constraint   $           1,773,410,162    $              462,552,545    $           1,310,857,617  
County Tax   $           1,790,285,216    $              461,395,874    $           1,328,889,343  
Average Tax   $           1,673,773,248    $              460,306,566    $           1,213,466,682  
County Subsidy   $           1,969,651,078    $              516,634,855    $           1,453,016,224  
Average Subsidy   $           1,880,582,535    $              537,712,321    $           1,342,870,215  
 
 Table 4.  NHP Acreage 
         Tax  Subsidy 
   Baseline   Constraint  County  Average  County  Average 
Corn  622,587  617,690  598,610  620,841  598,610  620,841 
Dry Cotton  209,500  209,500  209,500  209,500  209,500  209,500 
Irr. Cotton  231,500  231,500  231,500  231,500  231,500  231,500 
Peanuts  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Dry Sorghum  102,084  102,084  103,882  102,084  103,882  102,084 
Irr. Sorghum  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Dry Wheat  224,106  257,313  259,489  218,270  259,489  218,270 
Irr. Wheat  582,347  606,171  582,347  580,847  582,347  580,847 
Total  1,972,124  2,024,258  1,985,329  1,963,042  1,985,329  1,963,042 
 
Table 5.  SHP Acres 
         Tax  Subsidy 
   Baseline   Constraint  County Tax  Average Tax  County  Average 
Corn  231,078  228,536  224,100  228,812  224,100  228,812 
Dry Cotton  949,445  940,742  901,528  789,892  901,528  789,892 
Irr. Cotton  1,842,806  1,840,408  1,839,300  1,711,606  1,839,300  1,711,606 
Peanuts  108,254  108,254  64,262  77,554  64,263  85,187 
Dry Sorghum  198,090  198,067  194,472  198,090  194,473  198,090 
Irr. Sorghum  402,575  402,574  396,712  402,575  396,712  402,575 
Dry Wheat  214,800  214,800  209,800  209,800  209,800  209,800 
Irr. Wheat  120,000  120,000  106,019  120,000  106,020  120,000 
Total  4,067,048  4,053,380  3,936,194  3,738,329  3,936,195  3,745,962 
 
Table 6.  Total Carbon Emissions 
   THP  NHP  SHP 
Baseline   3,294,722,331  1,192,002,455  2,102,719,877 
Constraint  2,801,810,477  1,014,498,582  1,787,311,895 
County Tax  2,823,411,274  1,030,038,461  1,793,372,813 
Average Tax  2,721,828,781  1,014,498,582  1,707,330,199 
County Subsidy  2,823,411,274  1,030,038,461  1,793,372,813 
Average Subsidy  2,659,669,107  1,014,498,582  1,645,170,525 
 
 
 Table 7.  NHP Water Use per Crop (ac-in) 
   Corn  Cotton  Peanuts  Sorghum  Wheat 
Baseline   14,319,490  4,797,044  0  0  7,882,355 
Constraint  12,179,561  4,043,599  0  0  4,689,193 
County Tax  12,460,704  4,196,964  0  0  5,089,567 
Average Tax  12,429,024  4,068,930  0  0  4,598,628 
County Subsidy  12,460,704  4,196,964  0  0  5,089,567 
Average Subsidy  12,429,024  4,068,930  0  0  4,598,627 
 
Table 8.  SHP Water Use per Crop (ac-in) 
   Corn  Cotton  Peanuts  Sorghum  Wheat 
Baseline   4,209,405  32,187,579  2,489,849  6,177,123  1,487,182 
Constraint  3,681,260  27,068,221  1,970,295  2,569,809  886,261 
County Tax  3,632,541  28,335,422  1,445,246  2,755,649  887,683 
Average Tax  3,687,625  26,563,040  1,750,959  2,565,283  886,261 
County Subsidy  3,632,539  28,335,421  1,445,246  2,755,649  887,683 
Average Subsidy  3,687,625  26,483,169  1,834,492  2,565,283  886,261 
 
Table 9.  Total Water Use 
   THP  NHP  SHP 
Baseline   73,550,026  26,998,889  46,551,137 
Constraint  57,088,199  20,912,353  36,175,846 
County Tax  58,803,776  21,747,235  37,056,541 
Average Tax  56,549,751  21,096,582  35,453,169 
County Subsidy  58,803,773  21,747,235  37,056,538 
Average Subsidy  56,553,412  21,096,582  35,456,830 
 